Ordering infinite utility streams comes at the cost of a non-Ramsey set by Luc LAUWERS
 











Center for Economic Studies 




February 2009 Ordering innite utility streams
comes at the cost of a non-Ramsey set
Luc Lauwers
Center for Economic Studies, K.U.Leuven
Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven, BELGIUM
Luc.Lauwers@econ.kuleuven.be
Phone: 016.32.68.09. Fax: 016.32.67.96 
February 5, 2009
Abstract
The existence of a Paretian and nitely anonymous ordering in the set of innite util-
ity streams implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set (a nonconstructive object whose
existence requires the axiom of choice). Therefore, each Paretian and nitely anonymous
quasi-ordering either is incomplete or does not have an explicit description. Hence, the
possibility results of Svensson (1980) and of Bossert, Sprumont, and Suzumura (2006) do
require the axiom of choice.
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1 Introduction
With respect to the social objective in his innite horizon growth model, Ramsey (1928a,
p543) argues
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in the workshop \Intergenerational equity in climate negotiations, overlapping generations and social
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1... that we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a
practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of
the imagination ...
This basic principle of treating generations equally was already defended by Sidgwick
(1907) and is formally expressed by the anonymity condition. In the literature on repeated
games, the anonymity principle captures the idea of patience or of no discounting (e.g.
Rubinstein (1979) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Chapter 5). A second basic principle,
known as the Pareto principle, attaches positive value to the well-being of generations.
Both principles|anonymity and Pareto|are widely accepted (see Basu and Mitra,
2007; and Bossert, Sprumont, and Suzumura, 2006). The question whether or not an
ordering1 can respect the two principles (and how such an ordering looks like) has re-
ceived a lot of attention. Diamond (1965) established the celebrated result that nite
anonymity,2 Pareto, and continuity are incompatible when ordering innite utility streams.
Basu and Mitra (2003) show that Diamond's impossibility result persists when continuity
is dropped and representability is imposed: a Paretian social welfare function does not sat-
isfy anonymity and is necessarily inequitable. Since representability excludes (Rawlsian)
lexicographic relations, one is invited to check the robustness of Diamond's result when
both continuity and representability are dropped. Here, Svensson (1980) proves the pos-
sibility result that there exists a Paretian and nitely anonymous ordering. Recent work
in this strand includes Bossert, Sprumont, and Suzumura (2006), which extends Svens-
son result: there exist nitely anonymous and Paretian orderings that satisfy a suitable
version of the Pigou-Dalton principle (or Hammond's equity principle). These possibility
results, however, rely on nonconstructive methods (the Axiom of Choice; Szpilrajn, 1930)
and therefore lose a lot of attractiveness.3 In Hermann Weyl's words: a nonconstructive
existence proof informs the world that a treasure exists without disclosing its location.
Given these tracks|incompatibilities versus possibilities through the Axiom of Choice
|Fleurbaey and Michel (2003, p794) conjecture that
there is no explicit (that is, avoiding the axiom of choice or similar contrivances)
description of an ordering which satises weak Pareto and indierence to nite
permutations.
The question, thus, is: Is it possible to construct an ordering in the set of innite utility
streams that satises nite anonymity and Pareto?
This note conrms (a discrete version of) the Fleurbaey-Michel-conjecture. The main
result (Section 4, Theorem) can be phrased as follows:
1A quasi-ordering is a transitive and re
exive binary relation. An ordering is a complete quasi-ordering.
2Finite anonymity restricts the application of the standard anonymity requirement to situations where
utility streams dier in at most a nite number of components. In a setting involving innite utility
streams, nite anonymity is considered a weak intergenerational equity principle (Fleurbaey and Michel,
2003; Basu and Mitra, 2007).
3In case the existence of an object requires the Axiom of Choice, then we say that the object \is
nonconstructive" or \does not have an explicit description".
2Theorem. A nitely anonymous and Paretian quasi-ordering in the set of
innite utility streams made up of zeros and ones either is incomplete, or is a
nonconstructive object (and hence has no explicit description).
In the spirit of Weyl: the world is informed about a treasure (a nitely anonymous and
Paretian ordering) and about the fact that|with certainty|no one will ever disclose its
location.
In order to obtain this result, I consider the restricted domain f0;1gN0 of zero-one-utility
streams and I show that the existence of a nitely anonymous and Paretian4 ordering in
this domain entails the existence of a non-Ramsey set. From Mathias (1977) we know that
a non-Ramsey set (Ramsey, 1928b) is a nonconstructive object. The result extends to the
standard domain [0;1]N0 studied by Diamond, Svensson and Basu and Mitra. Indeed, the
restriction of a nitely anonymous and Paretian ordering in [0;1]N0 to the set f0;1gN0 is
a nitely anonymous and Paretian ordering in the restricted domain f0;1gN0. In other
words, the existence of a nitely anonymous and Paretian ordering in [0;1]N0 entails the
existence of a nitely anonymous and Paretian ordering in f0;1gN0.
This result is in line with those obtained by Zame (2007). Zame works with the standard
domain [0;1]N0, observes that nite anonymity boils down to the exchangeability of certain
random variables, applies the Hewitt-Savage 0-1 law, and shows that the existence of a
nitely anonymous and Paretian ordering entails the existence of a nonmeasurable set
which also is a nonconstructive object (Mathias, 1977).
The next section collects preliminaries. Section 3 shows how to use ultralters on
the set of positive integers in order to obtain nitely anonymous and Paretian orderings.
Section 4 recalls the denition of a Ramsey set and proves the Theorem. The end of
this section positions our result against those obtained by Zame (2007). The dierent
results are compared on the basis of the domain ([0;1]N0 versus f0;1gN) and the particular
version of the Pareto axiom. In the domain [0;1]N0 our result is slightly weaker than the
one obtained by Zame. In the restricted domain f0;1gN0 of zero-one-utility streams our
result is slightly stronger than the one obtained by Zame.
2 Preliminaries
We introduce basic denitions (e.g. Bossert et al, 2006; Basu and Mitra, 2007) and we
recall the Axiom of Choice.
2.1 Basic denitions
Let N0 = f1;2;3;:::g denote the set of positive integers and R the set of real numbers.
Let Y  R be the set of all possible utility levels. We assume that Y has at least two
4The Pareto axiom in the theorem is labeled \intermediate Pareto" and assumes sensitivity in each
innite set of coordinates. Intermediate Pareto is stronger than weak Pareto and weaker than strong
Pareto (see Section 2).
3distinct elements, say, 0 and 1. The set X = Y N0 collects all possible utility streams and
is called the domain. An innite utility stream x is a vector in X. Each x in X can be
viewed as a map from N0 to Y , associating with each n in N0 the element xn in Y . Each
utility stream x in f0;1gN0 is identied with the subset fnjxn = 1g of N0. Let S collect
all subsets of N0. Due to the identication of subsets of N0 with their indicator functions,
we abuse language and say that S is a subset of X. Vector inequalities are denoted , <,
and . Set inclusions are denoted  and .
A quasi-ordering is a re
exive and transitive binary relation and an ordering is a com-
plete quasi-ordering. The symmetric and the asymmetric component of the quasi-ordering
- are denoted by  and . The relation -1 is a subrelation to the relation -2 if for each
x and y in X we have (i) x -1 y implies x -2 y and (ii) x 1 y implies x 2 y.
A one-to-one map  from N0 to N0 is said to be a permutation. For each x in X, the
composite map x is a map from N0 to Y and can be written as the innite utility stream





The permutation  is said to be nite if there exists a t in N0, such that (n) = n for
each n  t. The permutation  is said to be xed step if there exists a t in N0, such that
(f1;2;:::;k tg) = f1;2;:::;k tg for each k = 1;2;:::.
Two of the most fundamental axioms in the area of ordering utility streams are the
anonymity and the Pareto principle. The next denition lists some modications.
Denition. Let - be a quasi-ordering in X.
- Strong Pareto: For each x and y in X, we have x < y implies x  y.
- Intermediate Pareto: For each x and y in X, we have x  y implies x - y,
and x < y and xi < yi for innitely many i in N0 implies x  y.
- Weak Pareto: For each x and y in X, we have x  y implies x - y,
and x  y implies x  y.
- Finite anonymity: For each nite permutation  and for each x in X,
we have x  x  .
- Fixed step anonymity: For each xed step permutation  and for each x in X,
we have x  x  .
The strong Pareto axiom postulates sensitivity in each coordinate. The intermediate Pareto
axiom postulates sensitivity in each innite set of coordinates. When ranking subsets of
N0, weak Pareto only requires that the full set N0 is strictly larger than the empty set.
Fixed step anonymity is more demanding than nite anonymity, and imposes indierence
between, for example, (1;0;1;0;:::;1;0;:::) and (0;1;0;1;:::;0;1;:::). Section 3 provides
examples of xed step anonymous and strong Paretian orderings in X.
42.2 The Axiom of Choice
The Axiom of Choice (AC) postulates for each nonempty family D of nonempty sets
the existence of a function f such that f(S) 2 S for each set S in the family D. The
function f is referred to as a choice function. AC does not provide an explicit way to
construct such a choice function and provoked considerable criticism in the aftermath of
Zermelo's formulation in 1904. The nonconstructive character of AC is further revealed by
Dianonescu (1975) who showed that AC implies the law of the excluded middle.5
AC is (i) consistent and (ii) independent: (i) AC can be added to the Zermelo-Fraenkel
axioms of set theory without yielding a contradiction,6 and (ii) AC is not a theorem of
the Zermelo-Frankel axioms (Fraenkel et al, 1973, Section II.4.2). Among the applications
of AC, we mention Zorn's Lemma and the theorem of Hahn-Banach. AC also implies a
number of paradoxes such as the decomposition of a sphere into a sphere of smaller size
and the existence of a nonmeasurable set of real numbers.
Constructive mathematics rejects the law of the excluded middle and hence rejects AC.
Beeson (1988 p42) lists a number of weaker choice principles that are generally accepted
by constructivists. The Axiom of Dependent Choice (DC) is an example. Let S be a
nonempty set and let R be a binary relation in S such that for each a in S there is a b in
S with (a;b) 2 R. Then, DC postulates the existence of a sequence (a1;a2;:::;an;:::) of
elements in S such that (ak;ak+1) 2 R for each k = 1;2;:::.
For a thorough discussion of constructivism and its modications, we refer to Beeson
(1988); for a discussion of constructivism in economic theory, to Velupillai (2005); and for
the history of the Axiom of Choice and its relation to the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set
theory, to Moore (1982) and Jech (1973, 1978).
3 Ultralters and possibility results
We recall the denition of an ultralter and show that its existence implies the existence
of a nitely anonymous and strongly Paretian ordering in X.
Let S be a set. A lter on S is a nonempty family F of subsets of S that satises
- the empty set is not in F,
- if A and B are in F, then A \ B is in F,
- if A is in F and A  B, then B is in F.
If the lter F on S satises
5The law of the excluded middle states the truth of `P or not-P' for each proposition P and can be





2 either is rational (in which case one sets a = b =
p
2) or is not rational (in which case
one sets a = c and b =
p
2). Conclude the existence of irrational numbers a and b for which ab is rational.
6Usually, ZF refers to the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms. ZFC is obtained from ZF by adding AC to it.
5- for each A  S, either A 2 F or its complement S   A 2 F,
then F is an ultralter. An ultralter is a lter that is maximal for inclusion. For example,
the family of all conite subsets of S (i.e. those subsets of S whose complements are nite)
is a lter on S. The family of all subsets of S that contain a given element of S is an
ultralter on S and is said to be principal. An ultralter is principle as soon it contains a
nite set. An ultralter that is not principle is said to be free. The intersection \FA of a
free ultralter F is the empty set.
AC (rephrased as Zorn's lemma) implies the ultralter theorem: each lter over a set S
can be extended to an ultralter. The ultralter theorem is weaker than AC. Nevertheless,
a free ultralter is a nonconstructive concept (Halpern, 1967; Jech, 1978).
For each n in N0, let -n be a Paretian and (nitely) anonymous ordering in Y n. Let
F be a lter on N0 that includes the family of all conite sets. Dene the relation -F in
X as follows. For each x and y in X, we have





 (x1;x2;:::;xn) -n (y1;y2;:::;yn)
o
2 F:
The relation -F is re
exive (use N0 2 F); transitive (use the intersection property: if A
and B are in F, then A \ B 2 F); strongly Paretian and nitely anonymous (use the
fact that each conite set belongs to F). In case the lter F contains the set t  N0 =
ft;2t;3t;:::;k t;:::g for each t in N0, then the relation -F satises xed step anonymity.
Furthermore, if F is an ultralter, then the relation -F is complete.
We apply this approach to the sequence of utilitarian orderings (see also Fleurbaey and
Michel, 2003). Let F be a lter on N0 that includes the family of all conite sets. The
quasi-ordering, dened by





 x1 + x2 +  + xn  y1 + y2 +  + yn
o
2 F;
extends the utilitarian criterion proposed by Basu and Mitra (2007).7 In case F is a free
ultralter, the relation -U;F is a strongly Paretian and nitely anonymous ordering in X.
Next, let L;n denote the leximin ordering in Y n and let F be a free ultralter on N0.
The ultralter-leximin ordering in X, dened by





 (x1;x2;:::;xn) L;n (y1;y2;:::;yn)
o
2 F;
is strongly Paretian, nitely anonymous, and inherits the following properties of the leximin
orderings:
- Hammond equity:
For each x in X, for each pair r and s in N0 for which xr > xs, for each yr and ys in
Y such that xr > yr > ys > xs, the utility stream y obtained from x by replacing xr
(resp. xs) by yr (resp. ys) is strictly preferred to x.
7Although the streams x = (1;0;:::;0;:::) and y = (1=2;1=4;:::;1=2k;:::) distribute the same total
utility, the utilitarian relation -U;F ranks x above y. This type of impatience can be avoided by developing
a two-step procedure that rst checks the convergency of
P1
i=1(yi xi) (see Lauwers and Vallentyne, 2004).
6- Hammond equity for the future:
For each x1, y1, x, and y in Y such that x1 > y1 > y > x, the innite utility stream
(y1;y;y;:::;y;:::) is strictly preferred to (x1;x;x;:::;x;:::).
The Hammond equity for the future axiom was introduced by Asheim and Tungodden
(2005), further discussed in Asheim, Mitra, and Tungodden (2006), and states the following.
If the present is better-o than the future and a sacrice now leads to a uniform gain for
all future generations, then such a sacrice is desirable, as long as the present remains
better-o than the future. Asheim, Mitra, and Tungodden explore dierent impossibility
results arising from this axiom.
Finally, starting from the sequence of Lorenz quasi-orderings, this ultralter approach
leads to a Lorenz quasi-ordering in the domain of innite utility streams that satises the
transfer principle (see also Bossert et al, 2006).
4 Non-Ramsey sets
We recall the Ramsey property, develop the main result, and position this result against
those obtained by Zame (2007).
Let I be an innite set and let n be a positive integer. Let [I]n collect all the subsets
of I with exactly n elements. Ramsey (1928b) shows that for each subset A of [I]n, there
exists an innite set J  I such that either [J]n  A or [J]n \ A = ?.
When n is replaced by countable innity, then Ramsey's theorem fails. There exists a
subset N of [I]1 such that for each innite subset J of I the class [J]1 intersects N and
its complement [I]1   N as well. Such a set N is said to be non-Ramsey. Building upon
the work of Solovay (1970), Mathias (1977) showed that the existence of non-Ramsey sets
does not follow from the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel (without AC).8
We develop an extra piece of notation. Let i < j be two natural numbers in N0. The
notation [i;j[ is a shorthand for the set fi;i + 1;:::;j   1g. Let S = fn1;n2;:::;nk;:::g
be an innite subset of N0, we assume nk < nk+1 for each k. We connect two innite sets
to S:
S1 = [n1;n2[ [ [n3;n4[ [ ::: [ [n2k 1;n2k[ [ :::; and
S2 = [n2;n3[ [ [n4;n5[ [ ::: [ [n2k;n2k+1[ [ ::::
The triples (S;S1;S2) play a crucial role in the main result. Recall that subsets of N0 are
identied with innite utility streams made up of zeros and ones.
Theorem. The existence of a complete, transitive, nitely anonymous, and intermediate
Paretian relation in the set of (innite) subsets of N0 entails the existence of a non-Ramsey
set.
8More precisely, Solovay proposed a model in which ZF and DC are true and in which AC fails. Mathias
showed that in this Solovay-model a non-Ramsey set does not exist. Hence, the existence of a non-Ramsey
set is independent of ZF + DC.
7Proof. Let the ordering - in [N0]1 satisfy intermediate Pareto and nite anonymity. Dene
N as follows:
N = fS jS1  S2g;
with (S;S1;S2) as above. We show that for each innite set S = fn1;n2;:::;nk;:::g in
[N0]1 there exists an innite subset T  S such either S or T belongs to N (the `either-or'
being exclusive). We distinguish two cases: S 2 N and S = 2 N.
Case 1. The set S is in N, in other words S1  S2.
Consider the subset T = fn2;n3;:::;nk;:::g obtained from S by cancelling out n1. Then,
T2 = [n3;n4[ [ [n5;n6[ [ ::: [ [n2k 1;n2k[ [ :::; and
T1 = [n2;n3[ [ [n4;n5[ [ ::: [ [n2k;n2k+1[ [ ::::
We have T2 [ [n1;n2[ = S1 and T1 = S2. Intermediate Pareto implies T2 - S1.
From S1  S2 and transitivity it follows that T2  T1.
Case 2.i. The set S is not in N, in particular S2  S1.
Again we consider the set T = fn2;n3;:::;nk;:::g. In case T1  T2 we are done. Otherwise,
we drop more elements from S. In particular, we drop n4 and n5, n6 and n7 until n2i and
n2i+1 to obtain the set U = fn2;n3;n2i+2;n2i+3;:::;nk;:::g such that:
U2 = [n3;n2i+2[ [ [n2i+3;n2i+4[ [ ::: [ [n2k 1;n2k[ [ :::; and
U1 = [n2;n3[ [ [n2i+2;n2i+4[ [ ::: [ [n2k;n2k+1[ [ ::::
The set U2 includes S1 n [n1;n2[ and the set U1 is a subset of S2.
The value of i should be large enough to guarantee that the cardinality of F = [n3;n2i+2[
exceeds the cardinality of G = [n1;n2[[[n3;n4[[ ::: [ [n2i+1;n2i+2[.
By nite anonymity G can be embedded in F. The relation U1  U2 follows.
Case 2.ii. The set S is not in N, in particular S1  S2.
Drop the elements n2 and n3, n6 and n7, n10 and n11 and so forth (n2+4k and n3+4k for
each k = 0;1;2;:::). We obtain from S the subset T for which
T1 = [n1;n4[ [ [n5;n8[ [ [n9;n12[ [ :::; and
T2 = [n4;n5[ [ [n8;n9[ [ [n12;n13[ [ ::::
The set T1 includes S1 and has innitely many elements more than S1. Also S2 includes
T2 and has innitely many elements more than T2. Due to intermediate Pareto, we obtain
T2  T1.
Starting from an element S in N (resp. not in N) we are able to nd innite subsets
of S not in N (resp. in N). The set N is a non-Ramsey set. 2
This result conrms the conjecture of Fleurbaey and Michel.9 Consider two dierent
utility levels, 0 and 1. In the domain f0;1gN0, intermediate Pareto notices an improvement
9The conjecture considers the continuous setting and weak Pareto. In contrast, we consider the discrete
setting and impose intermediate Pareto.
8in case innitely many generations increase their utility from 0 to 1. Furthermore, nite
anonymity is in the taxonomy of Fleurbaey and Michel (2003, Section 4.2) the weakest
anonymity condition in an environment involving innitely long utility streams. The result
states that each quasi-ordering in the domain f0;1gN0 that combines intermediate Pareto
and nite anonymity is either incomplete or has no explicit description.
This result reveals a contradiction between the nonconstructive character of a non-
Ramsey set (a concept going back to Ramsey, 1928b) and Ramsey's (1928a) rejection to
use a discount factor. In combination with Section 3, we conclude that the existence of a
nitely anonymous and Paretian ordering is \in between" the existence of a free ultralter
and the existence of a non-Ramsey set.
In order to position the result against those obtained by Zame, we distinguish the
domains [0;1]N0 and f0;1gN0. Zame obtains the following results:
 Zame (2007, p197). The existence of a nitely anonymous and weakly Paretian
ordering in [0;1]N0 entails the existence of a nonmeasurable set.
 Zame (2007, p200). The existence of a nitely anonymous and strongly Paretian
ordering in f0;1gN0 entails the existence of a nonmeasurable set.
Since the restriction of a nitely anonymous and intermediate Paretian ordering in [0;1]N0
to the restricted domain f0;1gN0 is a nitely anonymous and intermediate Paretian ordering
in f0;1gN0, we obtain:
 The existence of a nitely anonymous and intermediate Paretian ordering in [0;1]N0
entails the existence of a non-Ramsey set.
 The existence of a nitely anonymous and intermediate Paretian ordering in f0;1gN0
entails the existence of a non-Ramsey set.
In the domain [0;1]N0 Zame obtains the stronger result (weak Pareto is weaker than in-
termediate Pareto). In the domain f0;1gN0 our result is stronger (intermediate Pareto is
weaker than strong Pareto). Furthermore, within a discrete domain, it is impossible to
strengthen our result through the weakening of the Pareto condition. To see this, consider
the discrete set Yd = f0;1";2";:::g with " > 0. The map
f : Y
N0
d  ! R : x = (x1;x2;:::;xn;:::) 7 ! minfx1;x2;:::;xn;:::g
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